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Sunday, October 22nd, 2023
18:21
Some notes on Herbert Fingarette's 'Confucius: The Secular As Sacred.'
Men become human (that is, they attain Ren) when their raw impulse is shaped by Li, and Li is the fulfillment of human impulse; to cultivate Li is not to be dehumanized by the rote accordance with social expectation, it is through the understanding and alignment with social expectation to positive ends that one's humannness (Ren) is actualized through Li. There exists an ideal way to live that accentuates virtue, and this is through Li, humans can do no other.
When Ren is attained through Li, human dynamics are thus made harmonious, neither needs to be compelled as the mutual benefit of the arrangement is made apparent to them within the actions themselves, effortlessly. Interesting when compared to Taoism, wherein the notion of the effortlessnses of these concepts is challenged; see chapter 38 of the Tao Te Ching:
The highest virtue is not virtuous; therefore it truly has virtue. The lowest virtue never loses sight of its virtue; therefore it has no true virtue. The highest virtue takes no action, yet it has no reason for acting this way; The highest humanity takes action, yet it has no reason for acting this way; The highest righteousness takes action, and it has its reason for acting this way; The highest propriety takes action, and when no one responds to it, then it angrily rolls up its sleeves and forces people to comply. Therefore, when the Way is lost, only then do we have virtue; When virtue is lost, only then do we have humanity; When humanity is lost, only then do we have righteousness; And when righteousness is lost, only then do we have propriety. As for propriety, it's but the thin edge of loyalty and sincerity, and the beginning of disorder. And foreknowledge is but the flower of the Way, and the beginning of stupidity.
What could initially be taken as identical in scope is differentiated by the understanding that hierarchy and force underlies the acceptance of ritual propriety as a standard. Its focus on certain virtues over others may not necessarily reflect a lifestyle that is suited for everybody involved, and thus, due to its rigidity in its emphasis on the social contracts that encompass Li, it can only break.
To be fair to the author, Fingarette does point out that the individuals enacting Li must have some shared agreement in the purpose of the act, or else it loses its binding force: '. . . it is important that we do not think of this effortlessness as "mechanical" or "automatic." If it is so, then, as Confucius repeatedly indicates, the ceremony is dead, sterile, empty: there is no spirit in it.'
Fingarette then clarifies there are two contrasting kinds of failure in carrying out Li, mechanical failure due to lack of skill or understanding, and the lack of commitment and purpose: 'Beautiful and effective ceremony requires the personal "presence" to be fused with learned ceremonial skill.'
Fingarette espouses the merit of Li as evidenced in even such mere instances as the notion of handshakes and civil requests as they embody the concept of reciprocal social ritual, how when we live within the fusion of presence and this ritual, we act according to a golden mean wherein both parties act out and explore the arrangement to their respective benefits; what this does ignore, however, is that the arbitraity of such social arrangements oftentimes are backed up by the underlying implication of punishment for disobedience, even if what is erased by foregoing such social commitments is negligible if not non-existent. Force does exist in that such conventions can exist unjustly to the benefit of a hierarchy that does not return in kind to those constituting its foundations, such as patriarchy or capitalism, for instance. Confucians of Xunzi's school, as well as the Legalists might nod in agreement with what I write here, citing that such social correction, if not punishment does indeed exist, but argue that it is absolutely necessary as a safeguard for crafting the Junzi and establishing Li, but then, would we not be confronted with the fact that such a standard is evidently not fit for all individuals in a society? Surely the reinforcement of a standard of behavior to this degree would net not only the detestables, but also those of but another feather? Confucius evidently does not believe so, as he presumes that the standard of Li that exists by definition would engender the positive change desired in the people, it is only that it needs to be taught, and so flourish. Punishment and correction is not required, he says. Idealistic!
Interesting here that we go on to talk about the binding nature of language itself, however, with linguistic convention constituting a form of Li in how words themselves afford action, but only if they are received and understood by another party under that same harmonious convention. This is intriguing, and I find the notion relatively inarguable, if only for my lack of knowledge on the subject.
21:37
Again, the rectification of names. Failed to understand this concept on my last foray into Confucian thought, glad here to understand in the context of language why the emphasis on the definition of terms is of utmost importance to the social fabric under this framework. Not magic, not tradition, not alluding to the platonic forms in nature, but instead the harmony inherent to the mutual understanding of language that facilitates the enacting of Li. The analects say language mus be concordant; note that this does not imply a truth value, only that there is agreement: consistency. This allows for evolution in thought, at least!
The perspective of Li as the all-encompassing holy rite that governs society, emergent from collective humanness in aggregate, is very interesting, and helps again illustrate the similarities and divergences that exist in the Tao of Confucius when compared to Taoism. In essence, by engaging with Li as a Junzi, one has become the beneficiary of that which is reflected in Tian, it can be considered quite literally the harmonious goal of humanness.
22:18
Li is the map, the path is the Tao. Author points out that for all the emphasis put on the path, one's Tao, one's direction and course through life, both literally, metaphorically, and metaphysically, never once is the metaphor of the crossroads used. When it comes to choice and responsibility, the notion of Li as the social contract that binds humans and virtue, there can be only one path, and to fail to align with Li is to go off the path, or to travel crookedly. '. . . the only "alternative" to the one Order is disorder, chaos.' Deeply interesting. One does not reach a destination on this Path, instead, one attains a tranquil state that comes with the knowledge that one is travelling the path correctly to begin with.
There is thus no chance for choice, if one has chosen wrongly when travelling on their way, it is the result of a failure of cultivation of Ren, be it from the individual in question or their teachers, and thus they lose the path. It is not so much a wrong choice as it is a failure to stay the course, the correct course, the course that is attention to Li.
It is made apparent here that Confucius believes that punishment and promise of reward is not the way to govern, for in doing so you create the empty vessels unheeding of the path represented by those engaging in Li in hollow fashion; it is only be leading through Li, and setting an example that a truly human experience is engendered in the subjects. Here also does Fingarette point out what I alluded to earlier, describing how the Legalists' focus on carrot and stick over moral cultivation divorces itself from the Confucian worldview.
23:18
There is an interesting cyclical paradox to the relationship between Ren and Li. I have in my notes always defined the two as being framed within a causal relationship, wherein the commitment to Li (usually through De, that is, virtue) makes one Ren, though it is clear to me now that the equation can easily be reversed, and that it is in fact an aspiration to Ren, as an indiviual practice, that leads one to internalize Li, in the grander societal scope. Again, I use the word cyclical. I am sure much has been written on this, and that there is likely a formula that puts one before the other in a declarative manner, but I note this nonetheless. As Fingarette puts it:
Thus Li and Ren are two aspects of the same thing. Each points to an aspecr of the action of man in his distinctively human role. Li directs our attention to the traditional social pattern of conduct and relationships; Ren directs our attention to the person as the one who pursues that pattern of conduct and thus maintains those relationships.
When it comes to 'Yu' (a term that much googling fails to provide me with additional resources on, likely due to the romanization the author here uses), it can apparently be taken as the absence of Ren, and Ren, the absence of Yu. Often translated as sorrow, to be Yu is to be characterized by a lack of clear direction or readiness to act in accordance with Li.
Under this conception, Ren can be recognized in its relation to Li as being characterized by a comparative readiness to engage; under this framework, Li is the spatial, step-by-step enacting of societal, ritual convention, the physical, causal interstices of space on the path, with Ren being the individual in question's readiness and willingness to submit to Li, from some internal, mechanical process. Ren is the decider to Li's action. Ren can not fail, as it is purely an act of intent and decision on the part of the practitioner, it is only obstacles of Li from which issues flow; to say Ren is to fail is to say one has chosen the wrong path at a crossroads, no! There is no decision, if one has failed in intent, then it is not Ren; one can only be Ren if one is aiming for Li, and to aim for Li is to be Ren!
Onto Li as a societal standard though. The author here goes in depth into the question of how we reconcile the notion of a philosophy that inherently deals with a consistent, universally agreed upon set of social rituals that govern its interpersonal interactions with the fact that cultures across the world represent entirely different perspectives on such interactions, within and without even mainland China (for it would be just as true with Confucius' contemporaries as now!). Ultimately, the answer is that Confucius was a man of his times, both startlingly progressive in his desire to bring the disorder of contemporary China into order through the stratification of a new and novel philosophy that placed an emphasis on the societal unification of their disparate local cultures under the governing principles of Ren and Li, while also showcasing a traditional, customary bent in utilising his own culture (of which local provinces were predisposed to) as the standard by which such principles should accord. It is not a contradiction, but instead an understandable motivation. It is the tradition of the culture of the ancients that must take precedent, as the people are but followers in such matters, not the creators, and the rulers too arbitrary and power hungry to manufacture a standard with level-headed virtue; it is this tradition alone that stands monolithic, Confucius argues. As Fingarette puts it:
Confucius, the political man, conceived that the social crisis required cultural unity as an essential ground of a civilized political-social unity. And Confucius, the philosophical anthropologist, affirmed life lived in the image of the authentic ceremonial act as the necessary and sufficient condition of authentic humanity. The implications of these themes taken jointly call for political-social unity to be ceremonial. And this in turn calls for a tradition-oriented culture as essential ground out of which ceremony is nourished.
I do find reason to critique here, however. Fingarette is correct in illustrating Confucius' use of a mythic tradition rooted in ancient history as a tool in his desire to revitalize the people of his day to new, philosophical ends, but Fingarette is also quick to ignore the possible harm that could come from the sociohistorical tinkering this entails. To manufacture a mythic narrative in which things were better at some point in the past (under the aim of altering the present) is the emblem and armband of the reactionary, especially in a modern world where such romanticization substitutes meaningfully recorded history with falsehood. This is not to disregard the sentiment entirely, mind you, only to warn where Fingarette finds cause to dismiss. It is true that such romantic reflections can and does inspire meaningful cultural, human evolution; what are these notes if not an expression of that very reality? No, it only pays to be careful.
Very interesting work. The last chapter on the centrality of ritual compared to the individuality of the person engaging in the ritual is a nice place to end. Disagreeable work at points, though I imagine half of what I think is disagreement can actually be chalked down to my lack of expertise. Maybe I am but a utensil!
Thursday, October 26th, 2023
20:01
Began reading Henry Rosemont's 'Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion.'
Off the bat, Rosemont wants to define and contextualize Confucianism as being a collectivist, role-based ethical system that stands in contrast to both the individualism that typifies western philosophy, as well as the specific analogue of greek virtue ethics that is often held up as being the ethical system that stands closest to what he taught.
I myself have made the mistake of equating these two things in the past, even in these notes, if memory serves, but I do see the distinction. Virtues to the end of eudaimonia within western framing is an exercise in individualistic, internal change, whereas I can see already how one can define confucian terms and belief in opposition to such a conception. Rosemont does say there are competing perspectives on this point, and so I understand the difference in degrees that might have one stake out one position or the other.
20:22
In raising the idea of an "individual" in actuality being defined by the lattice of relationships (to other "individuals," as well as concepts, and acts) that constitute the whole, Rosemont himself immediately raises the question of what it means to be an "individual" "person" at all:
"Who plays these roles, if there is no individual self?" Where is the human core? What is essential to being Henry Rosemont, Jr.?
The response Rosemont offers is in the form of a quick analogy (chapter 3 will focus on this question in detail): People may be seen as Peaches, with the fruit's pit representing the immaterial self, shrouded in social, emotional (read: relational) stuff, or, Rosemont postulates, one can see people instead as Onions, with each successive layer representing relationships between the whole and that which exists outside of the whole; peel away every layer, and you find there is nothing left over. It is hard to say I am enchanted by the analogy, but I have an open mind. I am deterministic, after all, and do believe that what constitutes the self does (rather, can only!) be described as existing in relation to that which it is not (and perhaps this, I don't actually believe as strictly as I might think), I suppose it's just an argument of semantics, and how charitable I want to be about the idea of framing the whole of the self as being relational in this manner. Rather than a strict negative, I find myself mostly unsure!
It makes sense that I am having the same response to my short foray into Buddhism here, as Rosemont states in this same chapter that he has taught Buddhism in the west for over 40 years.
20:41
Ethical relativism. Genuinely don't know how to feel about this one. Rosemont argues that moral ambivalence (citing David Wong's 'Natural Moralities') is the answer; morality is a subjective, ever-evolving thing informed by cultural context, temporalism, as well as societal pressures, and so it can be said that there is no true one morality (divine command, eat your heart out)—if such societies (or, two opposing societies) bring about moral questions of which there can be debate, then it stands to reason that ambivalence, and thus an understanding of how one could have come to the conclusion opposing your own, is the answer. Recognize the relativism inherent to the situation, and dispose of stratifying the situation into strict rights and wrongs that characterize one's moral opponent as a strict enemy.
I am sympathetic to all of this, I really am. I would not describe myself as a Marxist, but I recognize the veracity of historical materialism, for instance. Environmental contexts can absolutely alter our perspective on morality, and so it is important to view the conversation being had within those contexts. Rosemont also goes on to frame that we, as socities, at best can only manage moral approximations, as the two western trends of deontological and utilitarian ethics are at argumentative odds, despite ultimately comprising—in tandem—the philosophical bedrock of our modern western society. We have not solved morality even now, is pluralism not the answer? Again, I am unsure of how to take this. I mentally presume that we do have some rough zone of a more moral endpoint to gravitate toward, and that argumentation between multiple viewpoints does help us hone in on this, but this puts me in a position of belief specifically in the existence of that endpoint as being 'true morality,' no? Such a conversation evokes the notion of consequentialism merely being the means by which we dictate a deontological code for every specific moral situation. I don't exactly have a substantive point here. I would just say that, though I of course believe comparative philosophy and morality is useful, rather, indispensable to us, I can also understand why, even in doing so, one comes out the other end still firm in their convictions over that of the moral position of another. The grey area in which ambivalence may be the answer doubtless exists (Rosemont illustrates this with the topic of abortion, which I believe to be one of the best), but there also exists instances wherein it is completely fair, to me, to denounce the actions of another individual or culture's moral ruling on a topic as "wrong," understanding, again, that this is all underpinned by such contextual relativisms. Perhaps I am too big for my boots here, but would this not dilute the governing power of Ren? If Ren exists, and that we can stray from Ren, would one not call an individual's willful rejection of the conventions that comprise Ren wrong, even if we understand that societal and environmental influence could be the factors that lead them to such a position? If the Li that governs another society's conception of Ren is at odds with ours, though we apply relativism, are we not still left with a culture practicing that which we consider to be immoral, or unjust? Is it just an issue of demonstrating the material harm? Is this not wrong, and thus worthy of condemnation? I am getting far ahead of myself.
Ultimately, Rosemont's point is that there are multiple philosophical threads and trends that can help 'make philosophy a global enterprise,' and so the pluralism described is more to the ends of helping to start the conversation on finding a reasonable ethical code (note, reasonableness here being defined in opposition to the analytical notion of certainhood), with Rosemont himself wanting to put classical Confucianism forward as one such possibility, arguing, perhaps counterintuitively, outside of the terms of ethical agency (as Rosemont rejects the very concept of ethical agents). We'll see how he does!
Friday, October 27th, 2023
20:40
Rosemont argues that, in transitioning our focus from an understanding of humans as free, individual moral agents, to that of role bearing persons, we will prioritize a social understanding of responsibility as contextual to the environment and education that lead to immorality, rather than the rote emphasis on punishment for individual misdeeds. This I can agree with.
Nice quotation on the conflict that exists between freedom and justice (reminds me of such arguments on positive/negative freedoms one finds in the left-libertarian sphere):
More specifically to the present case, I hope to show in succeeding chapters that from a Confucian perspective giving pride of place to the value of individual freedom in our contemporary capitalist society will always be at the expense of poverty alleviation. But I can only get you to entertain seriously the Confucian position to lower the value you place on freedom (procedural justice) if you also embrace the value of social (distributive) justice to some extent already. And if not, not; if you care not a whit about any responsibility for the plight of the poor all my efforts will be in vain. (So any reader unconcerned about poverty should probably stop reading this book now.) But that does not at all imply that I do not value freedom at all—vague though the term usually is—only that I am suspicious of the way it is most commonly employed to preserve an unjust status quo instead of achieving social justice, which I value highly, and am willing to act, and vote, accordingly.
The immediate issue I see with Rosemont's commentary on how the disparate ordering of ethical values between populations and peoples inherently requires us to take a pluralistic approach to morality is that the examples he uses are all, what one could call, edge cases. That is, they are ethical debates that exist on the periphery of a structurally "stable" society, in which foundational values that constitute the ordering of said society are largely agreed upon. He brings up such issues as abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty. These are, by definition, atypical situations. What is to be said about slavery and emancipation? The right for a woman to work and vote with basic autonomy? The rights for lovers of the same sex or gender to engage in a relationship? There existed in the past, just as there exists today societies which hold value orderings that would strip the rights of a great many people, up to and including half a society's population. Where does pluralism get us in such situations? Again, as mentioned in my previous entry, understanding the environmental contexts that created such a moral foundation in such societies is an exercise we should well practice, but I feel like the fact that such an obvious facet of ethical disagreements going unsaid in a world largely dominated by social codes that, to us in the west, seem inherently disagreeable due to the restrictions they place on what we understand to be innocuous social dynamics, is questionable at best.
21:08
Concept clusters. The linguistic package of terms and concepts that constitute the language of a philosophy, as defined by Rosemont. It's a good tool, and it is certainly hitting on a truth, that in approaching Eastern Philosophy especially, we tend to misapply our own analytical, western language concepts on top of such texts as something of an intellectual barometer. It's funny, he brings up the fact that in the days of Chaucer and later English Medieval writers, commentary and expectation on human conduct was ruled by such terms as "liegeful," "varlet," "sake," "shent," "troth," "chivalric," "boon," "soke," "sooth," "villein," and "churl," the conceptual package as a whole clustering around the idea of honor, as it was understood at the time. This is very helpful in illustrating the point; it's not that Eastern Philosophy is using "oriental" terms that can be said to approximate western concepts, no, it's that such philosophies arose (largely) independently within their own cultural context, and so we have to meet it on such terms, just as we would the concepts and terms that dominated even a historical western society.
21:17
Ah, here we go. This is what I was waiting for. Rosemont does apply a limiting factor to his ethical pluralism that seeks to address what he considers as 'unreasonable' ethical codes. He suggests a set of 'adequacy conditions' to counter the 'mindless relativism' that could inspire such unreasonable societies (a society that celebrates wanton violence can not be considered moral, Rosemont argues, as the inherent unreasonableness of the position would call into question the very definitions of the terms being used). Rosemont provides one such example of what could constitute such a set of adequacy conditions:
I. The moral code is subscribed to and followed by a group, and has its champions; II. The code is, or can be spelled out, and its implications explored; III. It can be defended competently from challenges and have at least a body of literature (writen or oral) devoted to elaborating the code; IV. The empirical content of the code must be plausible to all; V. It should be internally consistent, and its several elements cohere; VI. The code must have the intellectual resources for self-correction; VII. It should have at least a modicum of intuitive appeal to adherents of some other code(s); VIII. On a case-by-case basis, one of the above criteria might be waived on the basis of non-question-begging arguments; IX. The code cannot conflict with or violate any homoversal principle.
I understand and empathize with what is being gotten across here, I really do, but I likewise interpret this notion of adequacy conditions as being impractical and idealistic in nature, at least, impractical to the ends that Rosemont seeks, as I consider there to be something hypocritical here in relation to Rosemont's prior statements; I believe that the existence of a code that seeks to govern the reasonableness of ethical systems would inevitably, through means of debate such a set of adequacy conditions would engender in its aim of fostering comparative philosophy, lead to what one might consider a universal morality regardless. In this sense, I ironically find myself agreeing with the sentiment such a code proffers, only that I believe the resultant moral landscape would spell out the issues inherent to the plurality it seeks to attain. When an ethical code rubs up against the conditions outlined here, and finds itself internally inconsistent or unreasonable, the outcome we find ourselves championing is that such a system must evolve (to meet the standards of reasonableness we have dictated) or disperse. We trend toward a universal morality, or at least, a global society wherein the relative ordering of values becomes agreeable enough between all parties that argumentation on such points exists solely within the realm of peripheral edge cases deemed not important enough to wage violence for. Which, I mean, that's pretty cool! But it would be hard to call such a society pluralistic and understanding of opposing ethical views, all we would have done is constrained the ability to oppose to fit within a preordained box of reasonableness, that, by nature, is exclusive to many popular contemporary moral positions. In a way, all that I see such a set of adequacy codes allowing for is the co-existence of positions on yet unsolved philosophical issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, etc., as it is these examples that Rosemont repeatedly refers to.
Another issue I see here is the fact that homoversality itself is quite literally up for debate. It is by nature calling into question the notion of human nature, and all one needs do is look at political and religious debates of modernity (even between the Abrahamics, mind you!) to see that competing societies' understandings of such homoversal principles are at odds even now. It is not as cut and dry, and based on deterministic physiology as one might think. I do agree with Rosemont that there likely does exist a series of innate, human inclinations that speak to our biological, emotional priorities absent interference, but I very much doubt we can craft a comprehensive list that every ethical code agrees upon as being innate, let alone dictate which of those can not be violated upon by an overriding set of values each and every ethical code would be willing to abide by. Again, just an issue of idealism.
Sunday, October 22nd, 2023
18:21
Some notes on Herbert Fingarette's 'Confucius: The Secular As Sacred.'
Men become human (that is, they attain Ren) when their raw impulse is shaped by Li, and Li is the fulfillment of human impulse; to cultivate Li is not to be dehumanized by the rote accordance with social expectation, it is through the understanding and alignment with social expectation to positive ends that one's humannness (Ren) is actualized through Li. There exists an ideal way to live that accentuates virtue, and this is through Li, humans can do no other.
When Ren is attained through Li, human dynamics are thus made harmonious, neither needs to be compelled as the mutual benefit of the arrangement is made apparent to them within the actions themselves, effortlessly. Interesting when compared to Taoism, wherein the notion of the effortlessnses of these concepts is challenged; see chapter 38 of the Tao Te Ching:
The highest virtue is not virtuous; therefore it truly has virtue. The lowest virtue never loses sight of its virtue; therefore it has no true virtue. The highest virtue takes no action, yet it has no reason for acting this way; The highest humanity takes action, yet it has no reason for acting this way; The highest righteousness takes action, and it has its reason for acting this way; The highest propriety takes action, and when no one responds to it, then it angrily rolls up its sleeves and forces people to comply. Therefore, when the Way is lost, only then do we have virtue; When virtue is lost, only then do we have humanity; When humanity is lost, only then do we have righteousness; And when righteousness is lost, only then do we have propriety. As for propriety, it's but the thin edge of loyalty and sincerity, and the beginning of disorder. And foreknowledge is but the flower of the Way, and the beginning of stupidity.
What could initially be taken as identical in scope is differentiated by the understanding that hierarchy and force underlies the acceptance of ritual propriety as a standard. Its focus on certain virtues over others may not necessarily reflect a lifestyle that is suited for everybody involved, and thus, due to its rigidity in its emphasis on the social contracts that encompass Li, it can only break.
To be fair to the author, Fingarette does point out that the individuals enacting Li must have some shared agreement in the purpose of the act, or else it loses its binding force: '. . . it is important that we do not think of this effortlessness as "mechanical" or "automatic." If it is so, then, as Confucius repeatedly indicates, the ceremony is dead, sterile, empty: there is no spirit in it.'
Fingarette then clarifies there are two contrasting kinds of failure in carrying out Li, mechanical failure due to lack of skill or understanding, and the lack of commitment and purpose: 'Beautiful and effective ceremony requires the personal "presence" to be fused with learned ceremonial skill.'
Fingarette espouses the merit of Li as evidenced in even such mere instances as the notion of handshakes and civil requests as they embody the concept of reciprocal social ritual, how when we live within the fusion of presence and this ritual, we act according to a golden mean wherein both parties act out and explore the arrangement to their respective benefits; what this does ignore, however, is that the arbitraity of such social arrangements oftentimes are backed up by the underlying implication of punishment for disobedience, even if what is erased by foregoing such social commitments is negligible if not non-existent. Force does exist in that such conventions can exist unjustly to the benefit of a hierarchy that does not return in kind to those constituting its foundations, such as patriarchy or capitalism, for instance. Confucians of Xunzi's school, as well as the Legalists might nod in agreement with what I write here, citing that such social correction, if not punishment does indeed exist, but argue that it is absolutely necessary as a safeguard for crafting the Junzi and establishing Li, but then, would we not be confronted with the fact that such a standard is evidently not fit for all individuals in a society? Surely the reinforcement of a standard of behavior to this degree would net not only the detestables, but also those of but another feather? Confucius evidently does not believe so, as he presumes that the standard of Li that exists by definition would engender the positive change desired in the people, it is only that it needs to be taught, and so flourish. Punishment and correction is not required, he says. Idealistic!
Interesting here that we go on to talk about the binding nature of language itself, however, with linguistic convention constituting a form of Li in how words themselves afford action, but only if they are received and understood by another party under that same harmonious convention. This is intriguing, and I find the notion relatively inarguable, if only for my lack of knowledge on the subject.
21:37
Again, the rectification of names. Failed to understand this concept on my last foray into Confucian thought, glad here to understand in the context of language why the emphasis on the definition of terms is of utmost importance to the social fabric under this framework. Not magic, not tradition, not alluding to the platonic forms in nature, but instead the harmony inherent to the mutual understanding of language that facilitates the enacting of Li. The analects say language mus be concordant; note that this does not imply a truth value, only that there is agreement: consistency. This allows for evolution in thought, at least!
The perspective of Li as the all-encompassing holy rite that governs society, emergent from collective humanness in aggregate, is very interesting, and helps again illustrate the similarities and divergences that exist in the Tao of Confucius when compared to Taoism. In essence, by engaging with Li as a Junzi, one has become the beneficiary of that which is reflected in Tian, it can be considered quite literally the harmonious goal of humanness.
22:18
Li is the map, the path is the Tao. Author points out that for all the emphasis put on the path, one's Tao, one's direction and course through life, both literally, metaphorically, and metaphysically, never once is the metaphor of the crossroads used. When it comes to choice and responsibility, the notion of Li as the social contract that binds humans and virtue, there can be only one path, and to fail to align with Li is to go off the path, or to travel crookedly. '. . . the only "alternative" to the one Order is disorder, chaos.' Deeply interesting. One does not reach a destination on this Path, instead, one attains a tranquil state that comes with the knowledge that one is travelling the path correctly to begin with.
There is thus no chance for choice, if one has chosen wrongly when travelling on their way, it is the result of a failure of cultivation of Ren, be it from the individual in question or their teachers, and thus they lose the path. It is not so much a wrong choice as it is a failure to stay the course, the correct course, the course that is attention to Li.
It is made apparent here that Confucius believes that punishment and promise of reward is not the way to govern, for in doing so you create the empty vessels unheeding of the path represented by those engaging in Li in hollow fashion; it is only be leading through Li, and setting an example that a truly human experience is engendered in the subjects. Here also does Fingarette point out what I alluded to earlier, describing how the Legalists' focus on carrot and stick over moral cultivation divorces itself from the Confucian worldview.
23:18
There is an interesting cyclical paradox to the relationship between Ren and Li. I have in my notes always defined the two as being framed within a causal relationship, wherein the commitment to Li (usually through De, that is, virtue) makes one Ren, though it is clear to me now that the equation can easily be reversed, and that it is in fact an aspiration to Ren, as an indiviual practice, that leads one to internalize Li, in the grander societal scope. Again, I use the word cyclical. I am sure much has been written on this, and that there is likely a formula that puts one before the other in a declarative manner, but I note this nonetheless. As Fingarette puts it:
Thus Li and Ren are two aspects of the same thing. Each points to an aspecr of the action of man in his distinctively human role. Li directs our attention to the traditional social pattern of conduct and relationships; Ren directs our attention to the person as the one who pursues that pattern of conduct and thus maintains those relationships.
When it comes to 'Yu' (a term that much googling fails to provide me with additional resources on, likely due to the romanization the author here uses), it can apparently be taken as the absence of Ren, and Ren, the absence of Yu. Often translated as sorrow, to be Yu is to be characterized by a lack of clear direction or readiness to act in accordance with Li.
Under this conception, Ren can be recognized in its relation to Li as being characterized by a comparative readiness to engage; under this framework, Li is the spatial, step-by-step enacting of societal, ritual convention, the physical, causal interstices of space on the path, with Ren being the individual in question's readiness and willingness to submit to Li, from some internal, mechanical process. Ren is the decider to Li's action. Ren can not fail, as it is purely an act of intent and decision on the part of the practitioner, it is only obstacles of Li from which issues flow; to say Ren is to fail is to say one has chosen the wrong path at a crossroads, no! There is no decision, if one has failed in intent, then it is not Ren; one can only be Ren if one is aiming for Li, and to aim for Li is to be Ren!
Onto Li as a societal standard though. The author here goes in depth into the question of how we reconcile the notion of a philosophy that inherently deals with a consistent, universally agreed upon set of social rituals that govern its interpersonal interactions with the fact that cultures across the world represent entirely different perspectives on such interactions, within and without even mainland China (for it would be just as true with Confucius' contemporaries as now!). Ultimately, the answer is that Confucius was a man of his times, both startlingly progressive in his desire to bring the disorder of contemporary China into order through the stratification of a new and novel philosophy that placed an emphasis on the societal unification of their disparate local cultures under the governing principles of Ren and Li, while also showcasing a traditional, customary bent in utilising his own culture (of which local provinces were predisposed to) as the standard by which such principles should accord. It is not a contradiction, but instead an understandable motivation. It is the tradition of the culture of the ancients that must take precedent, as the people are but followers in such matters, not the creators, and the rulers too arbitrary and power hungry to manufacture a standard with level-headed virtue; it is this tradition alone that stands monolithic, Confucius argues. As Fingarette puts it:
Confucius, the political man, conceived that the social crisis required cultural unity as an essential ground of a civilized political-social unity. And Confucius, the philosophical anthropologist, affirmed life lived in the image of the authentic ceremonial act as the necessary and sufficient condition of authentic humanity. The implications of these themes taken jointly call for political-social unity to be ceremonial. And this in turn calls for a tradition-oriented culture as essential ground out of which ceremony is nourished.
I do find reason to critique here, however. Fingarette is correct in illustrating Confucius' use of a mythic tradition rooted in ancient history as a tool in his desire to revitalize the people of his day to new, philosophical ends, but Fingarette is also quick to ignore the possible harm that could come from the sociohistorical tinkering this entails. To manufacture a mythic narrative in which things were better at some point in the past (under the aim of altering the present) is the emblem and armband of the reactionary, especially in a modern world where such romanticization substitutes meaningfully recorded history with falsehood. This is not to disregard the sentiment entirely, mind you, only to warn where Fingarette finds cause to dismiss. It is true that such romantic reflections can and does inspire meaningful cultural, human evolution; what are these notes if not an expression of that very reality? No, it only pays to be careful.
Very interesting work. The last chapter on the centrality of ritual compared to the individuality of the person engaging in the ritual is a nice place to end. Disagreeable work at points, though I imagine half of what I think is disagreement can actually be chalked down to my lack of expertise. Maybe I am but a utensil!
Thursday, October 26th, 2023
20:01
Began reading Henry Rosemont's 'Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion.'
Off the bat, Rosemont wants to define and contextualize Confucianism as being a collectivist, role-based ethical system that stands in contrast to both the individualism that typifies western philosophy, as well as the specific analogue of greek virtue ethics that is often held up as being the ethical system that stands closest to what he taught.
I myself have made the mistake of equating these two things in the past, even in these notes, if memory serves, but I do see the distinction. Virtues to the end of eudaimonia within western framing is an exercise in individualistic, internal change, whereas I can see already how one can define confucian terms and belief in opposition to such a conception. Rosemont does say there are competing perspectives on this point, and so I understand the difference in degrees that might have one stake out one position or the other.
20:22
In raising the idea of an "individual" in actuality being defined by the lattice of relationships (to other "individuals," as well as concepts, and acts) that constitute the whole, Rosemont himself immediately raises the question of what it means to be an "individual" "person" at all:
"Who plays these roles, if there is no individual self?" Where is the human core? What is essential to being Henry Rosemont, Jr.?
The response Rosemont offers is in the form of a quick analogy (chapter 3 will focus on this question in detail): People may be seen as Peaches, with the fruit's pit representing the immaterial self, shrouded in social, emotional (read: relational) stuff, or, Rosemont postulates, one can see people instead as Onions, with each successive layer representing relationships between the whole and that which exists outside of the whole; peel away every layer, and you find there is nothing left over. It is hard to say I am enchanted by the analogy, but I have an open mind. I am deterministic, after all, and do believe that what constitutes the self does (rather, can only!) be described as existing in relation to that which it is not (and perhaps this, I don't actually believe as strictly as I might think), I suppose it's just an argument of semantics, and how charitable I want to be about the idea of framing the whole of the self as being relational in this manner. Rather than a strict negative, I find myself mostly unsure!
It makes sense that I am having the same response to my short foray into Buddhism here, as Rosemont states in this same chapter that he has taught Buddhism in the west for over 40 years.
20:41
Ethical relativism. Genuinely don't know how to feel about this one. Rosemont argues that moral ambivalence (citing David Wong's 'Natural Moralities') is the answer; morality is a subjective, ever-evolving thing informed by cultural context, temporalism, as well as societal pressures, and so it can be said that there is no true one morality (divine command, eat your heart out)—if such societies (or, two opposing societies) bring about moral questions of which there can be debate, then it stands to reason that ambivalence, and thus an understanding of how one could have come to the conclusion opposing your own, is the answer. Recognize the relativism inherent to the situation, and dispose of stratifying the situation into strict rights and wrongs that characterize one's moral opponent as a strict enemy.
I am sympathetic to all of this, I really am. I would not describe myself as a Marxist, but I recognize the veracity of historical materialism, for instance. Environmental contexts can absolutely alter our perspective on morality, and so it is important to view the conversation being had within those contexts. Rosemont also goes on to frame that we, as socities, at best can only manage moral approximations, as the two western trends of deontological and utilitarian ethics are at argumentative odds, despite ultimately comprising—in tandem—the philosophical bedrock of our modern western society. We have not solved morality even now, is pluralism not the answer? Again, I am unsure of how to take this. I mentally presume that we do have some rough zone of a more moral endpoint to gravitate toward, and that argumentation between multiple viewpoints does help us hone in on this, but this puts me in a position of belief specifically in the existence of that endpoint as being 'true morality,' no? Such a conversation evokes the notion of consequentialism merely being the means by which we dictate a deontological code for every specific moral situation. I don't exactly have a substantive point here. I would just say that, though I of course believe comparative philosophy and morality is useful, rather, indispensable to us, I can also understand why, even in doing so, one comes out the other end still firm in their convictions over that of the moral position of another. The grey area in which ambivalence may be the answer doubtless exists (Rosemont illustrates this with the topic of abortion, which I believe to be one of the best), but there also exists instances wherein it is completely fair, to me, to denounce the actions of another individual or culture's moral ruling on a topic as "wrong," understanding, again, that this is all underpinned by such contextual relativisms. Perhaps I am too big for my boots here, but would this not dilute the governing power of Ren? If Ren exists, and that we can stray from Ren, would one not call an individual's willful rejection of the conventions that comprise Ren wrong, even if we understand that societal and environmental influence could be the factors that lead them to such a position? If the Li that governs another society's conception of Ren is at odds with ours, though we apply relativism, are we not still left with a culture practicing that which we consider to be immoral, or unjust? Is it just an issue of demonstrating the material harm? Is this not wrong, and thus worthy of condemnation? I am getting far ahead of myself.
Ultimately, Rosemont's point is that there are multiple philosophical threads and trends that can help 'make philosophy a global enterprise,' and so the pluralism described is more to the ends of helping to start the conversation on finding a reasonable ethical code (note, reasonableness here being defined in opposition to the analytical notion of certainhood), with Rosemont himself wanting to put classical Confucianism forward as one such possibility, arguing, perhaps counterintuitively, outside of the terms of ethical agency (as Rosemont rejects the very concept of ethical agents). We'll see how he does!
Friday, October 27th, 2023
20:40
Rosemont argues that, in transitioning our focus from an understanding of humans as free, individual moral agents, to that of role bearing persons, we will prioritize a social understanding of responsibility as contextual to the environment and education that lead to immorality, rather than the rote emphasis on punishment for individual misdeeds. This I can agree with.
Nice quotation on the conflict that exists between freedom and justice (reminds me of such arguments on positive/negative freedoms one finds in the left-libertarian sphere):
More specifically to the present case, I hope to show in succeeding chapters that from a Confucian perspective giving pride of place to the value of individual freedom in our contemporary capitalist society will always be at the expense of poverty alleviation. But I can only get you to entertain seriously the Confucian position to lower the value you place on freedom (procedural justice) if you also embrace the value of social (distributive) justice to some extent already. And if not, not; if you care not a whit about any responsibility for the plight of the poor all my efforts will be in vain. (So any reader unconcerned about poverty should probably stop reading this book now.) But that does not at all imply that I do not value freedom at all—vague though the term usually is—only that I am suspicious of the way it is most commonly employed to preserve an unjust status quo instead of achieving social justice, which I value highly, and am willing to act, and vote, accordingly.
The immediate issue I see with Rosemont's commentary on how the disparate ordering of ethical values between populations and peoples inherently requires us to take a pluralistic approach to morality is that the examples he uses are all, what one could call, edge cases. That is, they are ethical debates that exist on the periphery of a structurally "stable" society, in which foundational values that constitute the ordering of said society are largely agreed upon. He brings up such issues as abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty. These are, by definition, atypical situations. What is to be said about slavery and emancipation? The right for a woman to work and vote with basic autonomy? The rights for lovers of the same sex or gender to engage in a relationship? There existed in the past, just as there exists today societies which hold value orderings that would strip the rights of a great many people, up to and including half a society's population. Where does pluralism get us in such situations? Again, as mentioned in my previous entry, understanding the environmental contexts that created such a moral foundation in such societies is an exercise we should well practice, but I feel like the fact that such an obvious facet of ethical disagreements going unsaid in a world largely dominated by social codes that, to us in the west, seem inherently disagreeable due to the restrictions they place on what we understand to be innocuous social dynamics, is questionable at best.
21:08
Concept clusters. The linguistic package of terms and concepts that constitute the language of a philosophy, as defined by Rosemont. It's a good tool, and it is certainly hitting on a truth, that in approaching Eastern Philosophy especially, we tend to misapply our own analytical, western language concepts on top of such texts as something of an intellectual barometer. It's funny, he brings up the fact that in the days of Chaucer and later English Medieval writers, commentary and expectation on human conduct was ruled by such terms as "liegeful," "varlet," "sake," "shent," "troth," "chivalric," "boon," "soke," "sooth," "villein," and "churl," the conceptual package as a whole clustering around the idea of honor, as it was understood at the time. This is very helpful in illustrating the point; it's not that Eastern Philosophy is using "oriental" terms that can be said to approximate western concepts, no, it's that such philosophies arose (largely) independently within their own cultural context, and so we have to meet it on such terms, just as we would the concepts and terms that dominated even a historical western society.
21:17
Ah, here we go. This is what I was waiting for. Rosemont does apply a limiting factor to his ethical pluralism that seeks to address what he considers as 'unreasonable' ethical codes. He suggests a set of 'adequacy conditions' to counter the 'mindless relativism' that could inspire such unreasonable societies (a society that celebrates wanton violence can not be considered moral, Rosemont argues, as the inherent unreasonableness of the position would call into question the very definitions of the terms being used). Rosemont provides one such example of what could constitute such a set of adequacy conditions:
I. The moral code is subscribed to and followed by a group, and has its champions; II. The code is, or can be spelled out, and its implications explored; III. It can be defended competently from challenges and have at least a body of literature (writen or oral) devoted to elaborating the code; IV. The empirical content of the code must be plausible to all; V. It should be internally consistent, and its several elements cohere; VI. The code must have the intellectual resources for self-correction; VII. It should have at least a modicum of intuitive appeal to adherents of some other code(s); VIII. On a case-by-case basis, one of the above criteria might be waived on the basis of non-question-begging arguments; IX. The code cannot conflict with or violate any homoversal principle.
I understand and empathize with what is being gotten across here, I really do, but I likewise interpret this notion of adequacy conditions as being impractical and idealistic in nature, at least, impractical to the ends that Rosemont seeks, as I consider there to be something hypocritical here in relation to Rosemont's prior statements; I believe that the existence of a code that seeks to govern the reasonableness of ethical systems would inevitably, through means of debate such a set of adequacy conditions would engender in its aim of fostering comparative philosophy, lead to what one might consider a universal morality regardless. In this sense, I ironically find myself agreeing with the sentiment such a code proffers, only that I believe the resultant moral landscape would spell out the issues inherent to the plurality it seeks to attain. When an ethical code rubs up against the conditions outlined here, and finds itself internally inconsistent or unreasonable, the outcome we find ourselves championing is that such a system must evolve (to meet the standards of reasonableness we have dictated) or disperse. We trend toward a universal morality, or at least, a global society wherein the relative ordering of values becomes agreeable enough between all parties that argumentation on such points exists solely within the realm of peripheral edge cases deemed not important enough to wage violence for. Which, I mean, that's pretty cool! But it would be hard to call such a society pluralistic and understanding of opposing ethical views, all we would have done is constrained the ability to oppose to fit within a preordained box of reasonableness, that, by nature, is exclusive to many popular contemporary moral positions. In a way, all that I see such a set of adequacy codes allowing for is the co-existence of positions on yet unsolved philosophical issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, etc., as it is these examples that Rosemont repeatedly refers to.
Another issue I see here is the fact that homoversality itself is quite literally up for debate. It is by nature calling into question the notion of human nature, and all one needs do is look at political and religious debates of modernity (even between the Abrahamics, mind you!) to see that competing societies' understandings of such homoversal principles are at odds even now. It is not as cut and dry, and based on deterministic physiology as one might think. I do agree with Rosemont that there likely does exist a series of innate, human inclinations that speak to our biological, emotional priorities absent interference, but I very much doubt we can craft a comprehensive list that every ethical code agrees upon as being innate, let alone dictate which of those can not be violated upon by an overriding set of values each and every ethical code would be willing to abide by. Again, just an issue of idealism.