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Friday, November 3rd, 2023
01:44
Very good points here on the notion of the subjective I, or 'you.' I'm nowhere near learned enough on Kant or Hume (that is to say, prior to this book I wouldn't have been able to tell you their philosophical positions outside of the quick rundown Rosemont himself gives in this chapter!), but I am understanding of the problem posed. I find in myself (begging the question, are we?) no rationale to make a firm statement on the solidity of I. Of course, I am, at least rationally, unaware of any semblance of a ghost in the machine, as it were, and do in fact believe that consciousness is an emergent property of the chemical, atomic structure of the biological mechanisms that constitute the human brain, so any philosophical position I could find agreement in would have to sit atop something of a secular, deterministic, framework. Ill-fated venture, probably?
Very illustrative hypothetical posed by Rosemont: if our physicality and memories, or the two in combination can be removed from the equation (as in the case of an amnesiac with a total personality shift, rendered meaningfully physically different due to an accident), we find that neither are necessary conditions for identifying a unique individual. We may still call the individual in question by their name, and transpose our understanding of that "prior" "self" onto the individual, but they do not meaningfully describe the individual before us; we can only be in error in this assessment. Indeed, Rosemont points out that the counter of "what else could the individual be if not the person they were before the accident?" begs the question, resting on the assumption of the individual self in the first place. Tricky!
We get into discussions here on the nature of the self as defined by an ongoing conscious experience, as one could remove the body (as in brain-in-vat scenarios, or Descartes demon) from the equation safely. Rosemont postulates that perhaps the self is defined as being the comprehensive observed image from the perspective of others, as contained within their memories, but this does not help us, as persons ourselves, define our own self, only those of others.
02:05
Fascinating example provided here on how identity may in fact be relational in nature, Katherine A. Nickels, a transgender individual writes in a Confucian term paper (unfortunately unpublished! I would love to read this):
As a transgender person part way through medical transition, gender was, and still is, a subject of great concern in the context of identity. This, however, has more to do with how I am treated and related to than it does to some internal need to actualize something about myself . . . . [G]ender doesn't exist for me unless it is relational.
I have thought on this quote pretty hard for the past 10 minutes, and I think I understand the perspective in a way that I was failing to grasp before. What is the self, in regards to gender, if not relational? A transgender person can be the same "self" pre and post-transition, with no internal change beyond that which responds to how they are treated by others via gender affirmation, etc., which in turn defines them. I am deeply intrigued by this perspective all of a sudden. I will think on this more.
02:19
I find myself sold on the idea of the individual self as being, as Rosemont states: 'an ontological fiction; a psychologically comforting (and/or frightening) fiction perhaps (like the belief in an immortal soul), but a fiction nevertheless.'
It is the comparison to the soul that helps illustrate the point, I feel. It is a foundational presumption that has to be taken for granted for the rest of the worldview to slot into place, but it is not one that, at least to me, can be justified. I guess it can be approximated as an assumption? I don't exactly know where that leaves me! It does seem that the individual as defined by its contextual relations to the world and other individuals is internally consistent, but I guess I'll have to find some critiques on this at some point lest I fall to the same unjustified presumption. Later, then.
Rosemont quotes Randall Collins, who points out that '. . . we arrive at individuals only by abstracting from the surrounding context.' That's a tough one. I won't take a crack at it from either perspective at this juncture.
On the question of 'who' exactly is bearing the roles under the confucian worldview, Rosemont postulates that it is simply 'the body' doing the work. With my physicalist perspective, I find myself in agreement. After all, it is the relations between other persons and the body in question that compose the roles that constitute the conceived 'self' being spoken of. Names are the clarifying factor in this regard, as it is the linguistic denotation applied to the body that we collectively recognize.
Rosemont does pose a counterargument from the individualist perspective himself, however. It boils down to 'even if the individual self is a fiction, we still ought to presume the prescriptive validity of such an assumption as a mooring point for moral considerations; the definition of the essential individual self is normative.' This is functionally the contention I currently have, being that the paradigm shift in self-perception offered by Rosemont would have to be more prescriptively beneficial, and this is what he says he aims to do in his advocacy of the role-bearing person.
Friday, November 3rd, 2023
01:44
Very good points here on the notion of the subjective I, or 'you.' I'm nowhere near learned enough on Kant or Hume (that is to say, prior to this book I wouldn't have been able to tell you their philosophical positions outside of the quick rundown Rosemont himself gives in this chapter!), but I am understanding of the problem posed. I find in myself (begging the question, are we?) no rationale to make a firm statement on the solidity of I. Of course, I am, at least rationally, unaware of any semblance of a ghost in the machine, as it were, and do in fact believe that consciousness is an emergent property of the chemical, atomic structure of the biological mechanisms that constitute the human brain, so any philosophical position I could find agreement in would have to sit atop something of a secular, deterministic, framework. Ill-fated venture, probably?
Very illustrative hypothetical posed by Rosemont: if our physicality and memories, or the two in combination can be removed from the equation (as in the case of an amnesiac with a total personality shift, rendered meaningfully physically different due to an accident), we find that neither are necessary conditions for identifying a unique individual. We may still call the individual in question by their name, and transpose our understanding of that "prior" "self" onto the individual, but they do not meaningfully describe the individual before us; we can only be in error in this assessment. Indeed, Rosemont points out that the counter of "what else could the individual be if not the person they were before the accident?" begs the question, resting on the assumption of the individual self in the first place. Tricky!
We get into discussions here on the nature of the self as defined by an ongoing conscious experience, as one could remove the body (as in brain-in-vat scenarios, or Descartes demon) from the equation safely. Rosemont postulates that perhaps the self is defined as being the comprehensive observed image from the perspective of others, as contained within their memories, but this does not help us, as persons ourselves, define our own self, only those of others.
02:05
Fascinating example provided here on how identity may in fact be relational in nature, Katherine A. Nickels, a transgender individual writes in a Confucian term paper (unfortunately unpublished! I would love to read this):
As a transgender person part way through medical transition, gender was, and still is, a subject of great concern in the context of identity. This, however, has more to do with how I am treated and related to than it does to some internal need to actualize something about myself . . . . [G]ender doesn't exist for me unless it is relational.
I have thought on this quote pretty hard for the past 10 minutes, and I think I understand the perspective in a way that I was failing to grasp before. What is the self, in regards to gender, if not relational? A transgender person can be the same "self" pre and post-transition, with no internal change beyond that which responds to how they are treated by others via gender affirmation, etc., which in turn defines them. I am deeply intrigued by this perspective all of a sudden. I will think on this more.
02:19
I find myself sold on the idea of the individual self as being, as Rosemont states: 'an ontological fiction; a psychologically comforting (and/or frightening) fiction perhaps (like the belief in an immortal soul), but a fiction nevertheless.'
It is the comparison to the soul that helps illustrate the point, I feel. It is a foundational presumption that has to be taken for granted for the rest of the worldview to slot into place, but it is not one that, at least to me, can be justified. I guess it can be approximated as an assumption? I don't exactly know where that leaves me! It does seem that the individual as defined by its contextual relations to the world and other individuals is internally consistent, but I guess I'll have to find some critiques on this at some point lest I fall to the same unjustified presumption. Later, then.
Rosemont quotes Randall Collins, who points out that '. . . we arrive at individuals only by abstracting from the surrounding context.' That's a tough one. I won't take a crack at it from either perspective at this juncture.
On the question of 'who' exactly is bearing the roles under the confucian worldview, Rosemont postulates that it is simply 'the body' doing the work. With my physicalist perspective, I find myself in agreement. After all, it is the relations between other persons and the body in question that compose the roles that constitute the conceived 'self' being spoken of. Names are the clarifying factor in this regard, as it is the linguistic denotation applied to the body that we collectively recognize.
Rosemont does pose a counterargument from the individualist perspective himself, however. It boils down to 'even if the individual self is a fiction, we still ought to presume the prescriptive validity of such an assumption as a mooring point for moral considerations; the definition of the essential individual self is normative.' This is functionally the contention I currently have, being that the paradigm shift in self-perception offered by Rosemont would have to be more prescriptively beneficial, and this is what he says he aims to do in his advocacy of the role-bearing person.